ZERO DAY AI LABS
Next cohort · Winter 2027

Attacking and Defending AI Agents

The first half breaks agents the way the published attacks do. The second half rebuilds one that refuses every one of them, and you measure it on AgentDojo before and after.

Format
Ten weeks, live online. Two one-hour sessions a week and one lab a week.
Dates
Monday 11 January 2027 to 19 March 2027. Every course runs in every cohort.
Price
2,500 USD per seat. Your seat includes the recordings of every session.
Seats
30. Team seats available.
Refund
Full refund until the first live session starts, none after. The terms say the rest.

Who it is for

You defend, or will defend, agents that read the web, hold credentials, and run tools. You want to know what an attacker does first, and what a control must refuse for that attack to fail. You bring an agent you run today, or you use ours.

What you leave with

  • A working set of the attacks that broke production agents in the last two years: indirect injection, tool poisoning, memory poisoning, zero-click browser hijack, and privilege escalation across tools.
  • Your agent scored against the AgentDojo benchmark before and after you defend it. That is 629 security cases and 97 utility tasks.
  • The same agent rebuilt inside a boundary: one identity, a grant checked on every call, a sandbox with declared egress, pinned tools, and a journal you can replay.
  • The proof that each attack from the first half now fails, and the numbers to show your security review.
  • The recordings, the manifests, and the code. All of it is yours.

The syllabus follows the published record

The attacks come from the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, the MITRE ATLAS agentic techniques, and the incidents behind them. The defenses come from the design-pattern papers and the systems that hold up on AgentDojo. We name the source for every attack and every control, so you can check our work.

The weeks

This outline is the shape of the course. We revise the attacks between cohorts, because the attacks change.

Week 1. The threat model

The lethal trifecta: private data, untrusted content, and a path out. OWASP ASI01 through ASI10. The ATLAS agentic techniques. Lab: map the agent you brought to all three before the hour is up.

Week 2. Indirect prompt injection

A web page, an email, a document, or a tool result carries the instruction. EchoLeak is the case study: one email, zero clicks, and the files left the tenant. Lab: hijack an email agent.

Week 3. Tool poisoning over MCP

A poisoned description, a rug pull after approval, and a tool that shadows another. Lab: publish a poisoned tool and watch the agent obey it.

Week 4. Memory and context poisoning

An instruction that survives into the next session. Lab: plant it, close the session, and watch it fire in the next one.

Week 5. Browser and computer-use agents

The zero-click class: PleaseFix, ZombieAgent, and their kin. Lab: a page that drives the agent.

Week 6. Excessive agency and delegation

The shared service account. The confused deputy across two tools. One compromised agent that instructs another. Lab: start with a read tool, end with a write, then pivot through a sub-agent.

Week 7. Measure it

AgentDojo, and what a benchmark can and cannot tell you. Lab: run your agent against AgentDojo and record the number. That number is the one you beat.

Week 8. What holds and what does not

Adaptive attacks against prompt defenses and detectors. The patterns that hold: action selector, plan then execute, dual LLM, code then execute, and context minimization. The Rule of Two. Lab: rebuild the email agent under a reference monitor, CaMeL style.

Week 9. Identity and grants

One SPIFFE identity per agent. A grant bounded by the human who gave it. Authorization at call time with OpenFGA. Lab: the attack from week two, now refused.

Week 10. Sandboxes, egress, and the tool supply chain

Firecracker microVMs and gVisor. Egress declared up front. Every tool description pinned by hash. Lab: the exfiltration fails at the network, and the rug pull fails at the pin.

Week 11. Budgets, journals, and replay

A budget per session stops the runaway loop. A journal replays the run for the reviewer. Lab: replay every attack from weeks two through six and show where each one stopped.

Week 12. Ship it

Run AgentDojo again on the defended agent. Compare utility and security against your week seven number. Lab: the report your security review will accept, with the numbers in it.

The lab

The first half runs against a deliberately vulnerable agent environment. The second half runs on Gibson, which is the reference control for identity, grants, sandboxed execution, and replay. Each student gets their own tenant. Nothing is a simulation. Your work stays up for a week after the course so you can finish what you started.